26 June 2025

Cockpit Observation Programme for Helicopter Operations

Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) is a programme for the management of human error in aviation operations and, as a capability, has extended beyond a focus on flight operations into ground operations, maintenance and general behavioural safety (through application of Threat and Error Management Training (TEM)). Its background and development resulted in a Human Factors Research Project at the University of Texas that received FAA funding to develop LOSA in the early 1990s as a research effort to assess the transfer of Crew Resource Management (CRM) training from the classroom to the flight line. LOSA was then developed in a partnership between the University of Texas Human Factors Research Project (UT) and Delta Airlines in 1994 (Merrit & Klinect, 2006).

The University of Texas Threat and Error Management (UTTEM) model forms the basis of the ICAO Document 9803 (2002) outlining the Line Operations Safety Audit process. The focus is on providing an operator with ‘an organisational strategy aimed at improving the management of human error and developing countermeasures to error in operational environments’ (ICAO, 2002).

LOSA traditionally places expert observers on flight deck jumpseats on routine line flight and uses the Threat and Error Management (TEM) model as a framework to collect and categorise crew performance data. This data can be used proactively to provide ‘a diagnostic snapshot of organisational performance [and also provide] a data-driven mechanism for measuring change’ (Klinect, Murray, Merritt, & Helmreich, 2003) that has the potential to impact nearly all departments in the airline by helping to:

  • Identify threats in the airline’s operating environment
  • Identify threats to the airline’s operations
  • Assess the degree of transference of training to the line
  • Check the quality and usability of procedures
  • Identify design problems in the human-machine interface
  • Understand pilots’ shortcuts and workarounds
  • Assess safety margins
  • Provide a baseline for organisational change; and
  • Provide a rationale for the allocation of resources. (FAA, 2006, p.3)

Catch up with the Flight Plan Podcast

Discussing aviation safety, risk management and industry best practices.

Click here

A useful analogy for understanding the premise of LOSA is offered by the original developers

"In the most general of terms, LOSA is similar to getting your cholesterol checked during a routine examination. The test, usually performed as a preventive measure, provides evidence of risk on having a heart attack or other serious health event. The results themselves do not provide a solution, but can prompt a person to make healthier lifestyle choices. A person might also choose to do nothing and carry on as normal. Either way, the person learned something and is responsible for change. LOSA is the same. It provides a diagnostic snapshot of safety performance. It uses cockpit observations collected in normal operations to provide a profile of safety strengths and weaknesses. Similarly, the onus is on the airline to respond to the data and make changes if necessary, in order to prevent an incident or accident."

Klinect, Murray, Merritt, & Helmreich, 2003

The UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) promotes the application of Cockpit Observation Programmes (COP) and LOSA. Cockpit Observation Programmes are an evolution of the Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) capability through the application of cameras to assist in monitoring crew performance either with a trained observer on a jumpseat or passenger seat or in place of the observer, where it is not practical due to helicopter type considerations. The use of cameras is an added dynamic that allows capture of operationally significant performance information into the operator’s safety assurance program that compensates for a lack of a fitted jumpseat or impractical seating arrangement (restricting crew observations) and also where aircraft payload considerations apply. A COP is a ‘data-driven approach to proactively identify and address safety concerns in aviation by focusing on monitoring skills, training, and ongoing safety improvement efforts’ (CAA). Further industry guidance is being prepared on COP through a HeliOffshore (global, safety-focused association for the offshore helicopter industry) working group.

ICAO (ICAO, 2002, pp. 2-5) and the FAA (FAA, 2014) describe ten essential characteristics that define a LOSA, the latter are a variation of the ICAO originals. It is essential that for a COP to be valid that it should fully align to the 10 characteristics that define a LOSA.

These characteristics are:

ICAO
FAA
Jumpseat observations during normal flight operations
Peer-to-peer observations during normal operations
Joint management/pilot sponsorship
Joint management and union sponsorship
Voluntary crew participation
Voluntary participation
De-identified, confidential and safety-minded data collection
Anonymous, confidential, and non-punitive data collection
Targeted observation instrument
Systematic observation instrument based on Threat and Error Management (TEM)
Trusted, trained and calibrated observers
Trusted and trained observers
Trusted data collection site
Secure data collection repository
Data verification roundtables
Data verification roundtables
Data-derived targets for enhancement
Data-derived targets for enhancement
Feedback of results to the line pilots
Feedback of results to the workforce

COP, LOSA and Offshore Helicopter Operations

For offshore operations the LOSA requirement stems from the Offshore Helicopter Recommended Practices (OHRP) Report 690 published by the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (IOGP) (IOGP Safety Committee, 2022) and its component documents that provide recommended practices that assist in the safe, effective, and efficient management of offshore commercial helicopter transport operations. The 690 document reflects industry best practices, developed in collaboration between oil and gas companies, aviation industry associations, and helicopter operators. It is assumed that operators adopting the Offshore OHRP will provide the framework for effective management of a key material risk to the safety of offshore personnel. The IOGP OHRP content differs from its predecessor, Report 590, in several areas, including the following key elements:

Expectation:

The Aircraft Operator has a structured Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) programme for multi-crew operations.

Processes and Practices:

  • The LOSA programme complies with ICAO Doc 9803.
  • The LOSA data is analysed, and appropriate action plans are implemented.
  • LOSA observations are conducted periodically, and a full observation cycle is conducted at a minimum every three years.
  • IOGP 690 Section 14

A COP using cockpit camera(s) can support operators meeting this requirement, especially where jumpseats or cabin seats are unavailable or unusable by observers to support a standard LOSA.

COP: Camera-based LOSA observation

Unlike many fixed-wing commercial passenger aircraft, Helicopters do not have dedicated jumpseats to support in-flight observations. A few large helicopter types are capable of being fitted with a jumpseat, often one that restricts access to the cabin and egress for the crew and the observer. Where a jumpseat is not an option, the observer must be seated in the cabin, often facing rearward, unless a specific seating arrangement is approved. In addition to the availability and access issues, the carriage of an observer reduces payload and so revenue, for example, an 8-passenger helicopter suffers a payload and revenue reduction of 12.5%, impacting both the operator and the customer.

Since the conception of LOSA in the 1990s, the size and capability of audio-visual recording and data handling equipment have improved dramatically. Whereas the use of replayed in-cockpit recording for LOSA would not have been feasible at the inception of LOSA 30 years ago, current technology using high-definition cameras with image stabilisation provides an improved recording capability. COP includes an assessment of the feasibility of using post-flight replay of camera footage in place of an observer present in flight.

COP and LOSA support Evidence-Based Training (EBT) in helicopter operations

The Evidence-Based Training (EBT) arose based on concerns that crew type-rating and recurrent training were not sufficient in understanding the effectiveness of Standard Operating Procedures and crew performance in line operations and emergency situations. An EBT capability reviews all available data from multiple sources, including COP/LOSA, FDM/FOQA Flight Data, system audits, safety reporting programs, Key Performance Indicator (KPI) trends, and causal factor analysis from incident/accident databases.

COP entails trained Observers either occupying the jumpseat or using camera-based observations of flight crew behaviours, and collecting safety-related data on environmental conditions, operational complexity, and Flight Crew performance. Where the observer is on a jumpseat, the camera is still fitted to allow review and clarification of monitored crew performance post-flight, if necessary. COP aims to collect data based on Threats (such as adverse weather), Errors (such as selecting a wrong automation mode) and Undesired Operational States (such as an altitude/LSALT deviation) which are everyday events that Flight Crews must manage to maintain safety. Flight Crews/Mission Crews that successfully manage these events regardless of occurrences are assumed to increase their potential for maintaining adequate safety margins. Through the use of camera-based observations, especially in operational types not fitted with jumpseats, the program can provide a wealth of additional operational performance monitoring information (that would previously not have been available) to support validation of training programs (safety, procedural, or training changes are being practiced) and effective safety oversight. The use of cameras allows the observer to pause and rewind the video when reviewing threat and or error management events, as well as the ability to zoom in on cockpit instrument displays and panel switch/mode positions to confirm crew action or inaction.

Some Considerations of a COP

  • Whether the camera is walk-on equipment (GoPro) or will require a Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) supporting modification to the aircraft (e.g. camera mounts).
  • Ability to use installed cockpit camera (resolution, FOV)
  • Camera battery life compared to flight sector length
  • Ability to record cockpit audio (in line audio connector, digital converter, signal attenuator)
  • SD card data protocols and handling
  • Observer requiring a secure laptop, sterile working conditions and a dedicated COP/LOSA software support tool.

A camera-based COP can enhance an existing LOSA program (as long as the 10 characteristics of LOSA are followed) and, further, to truly provide a continuous monitoring capability to flight operations oversight, supporting safety assurance with a constant stream of cockpit observational data. This allows targeted monitoring of at-risk areas that also supports continuous monitoring of operational, procedural and/or safety changes that have been made promptly. COP also facilitates the capture of observational data that would have been lost on fleet types without jumpseat or crew seat monitoring capability.

Back to Basics: Management of Change

Aviation change management protects operations with structured processes identify risks and safety opportunities during organisational shifts.

Read now

The Intersection of Aviation and Insurance

Aviation insurers navigate evolving risks like AI, climate change, and pilot shortages by improving data quality, collaboration, and underwriting models.

Read now

Positioning Ground Operations for Success

Ground operations risk USD10B in damage by 2035. Governance, training, and risk analysis can proactively strengthen safety and operational performance.

Read now

Communication Key to Safety Improvements

Crew Resource Management transformed cockpit culture, proving that open communication, teamwork, and threat management are essential to flight safety.

Read now
Back to Home

Share on social

The Walbrook Building 25 Walbrook London, EC4N 8AW

Legal & Regulatory | Privacy Policy

In association with

Author

Simon Stewart

Managing Director

Sirius Aviation

www.siriusav.com

Arthur J. Gallagher (UK) Limited is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority. Registered Office: The Walbrook Building, 25 Walbrook, London EC4N 8AW. Registered in England and Wales. Company Number: 119013.