13 December 2023
LOSA for Helicopter Operations
A Line Oriented Safety Audit (LOSA) is a proactive and predictive safety tool that incorporates the principles of Threat and Error Management (TEM), recognising that threats and errors are likely to occur in normal operations. The TEM model provides a framework that allows LOSA observers to capture the interaction between people and the operational context, by recording how frontline employees manage these situations to maintain safety.
Offshore Oil and Gas Producers are increasingly expecting their contracted helicopter service providers to conduct Line Oriented Safety Audits (LOSA). As a fixed wing concept transferred to the rotary wing environment, there are new operational and logistical challenges to overcome. The key, however, is to concentrate on achieving the objective of LOSA, rather than simply making a fixed wing LOSA work in helicopters.
The limitations imposed by helicopter operations, and the changes in the operational and technical environments since the conception of LOSA, point toward the concept of a specific Helicopter LOSA (H-LOSA), aimed at gathering the necessary data in the manner most appropriate for helicopters.
Requirement of Offshore Oil and Gas Helicopter
The LOSA requirement stems from the Offshore Helicopter Recommended Practices (OHRP) Report 690 published by the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (IOGP), and its component documents that provide recommended practices that assist in the safe, effective, and efficient management of offshore commercial helicopter transport operations. The 690 document reflects industry best practices, developed in collaboration between oil and gas companies, aviation industry associations, and helicopter operators. It is assumed that operators adopting the Offshore OHRP will provide the framework for effective management of a key material risk to the safety of offshore personnel. The IOGP OHRP content differs from its predecessor, Report 590, in several areas including the following key elements:
Expectation:
The Aircraft Operator has a structured Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) programme for multi-crew operations.
Processes and Practices:
The LOSA programme complies with ICAO Doc 9803.
The LOSA data is analysed, and appropriate action plans implemented.
LOSA observations are conducted periodically, and a full observation cycle is conducted at a minimum every three years.
Background and History of LOSA (ICAO 9803)
As outlined in ICAO Document 9803 (ICAO, 2002) (Ch2), the University of Texas at Austin Human Factors Research Project, with funding from the FAA (Human Factors Division, AAR-100), developed LOSA to monitor normal line operations. The methodology involves training selected line pilots as LOSA observers to observe and record operational data on a specialised report form, to monitor adherence to Standard Operating Procedures, the effectiveness of Threat and Error Management (TEM) and Crew Resource Management (CRM) behaviours.
In its early form, LOSA mostly focused on CRM performance. The reason for this was that researchers and airlines alike wanted to know more about the actual practice of CRM rather than just formulating conclusions about its effectiveness from data collected within the training environment, as was the established practice. After LOSA audits were conducted, the unique insights gathered from this methodological approach of monitoring normal operations not only advanced the concepts of CRM, but also encouraged new ways of thinking about crew performance. LOSA has turned into a strategy of systematic line observations to provide safety data on the way an operator’s flight operations system is functioning. The data generated from LOSA observations provide diagnostic indicators of organisational strengths and weaknesses of inflight operations as well as an overall assessment of crew performance, both in the technical and human performance areas. LOSA is a data-driven approach to the development of countermeasures to operational threats and errors.
ICAO (ICAO, 2002, pp. 2-5) and the FAA (FAA, 2014) describe ten essential characteristics that define a LOSA, the latter are a variation of the ICAO originals.
These characteristics are:
LOSA Model Cycle
To sustain safety in a constantly changing environment, LOSA data must be collected and analysed on a routine basis, to identify the targets for enhancement and then a formal Safety Change Process (SCP) must occur, in order to bring about improvement.
The basic steps of the SCP:
- Measurement (with LOSA) to obtain the targets
- Detailed analysis of targeted issues
- Listing of potential changes for improvement
- Risk analysis and prioritisation of changes
- Selection and funding of changes
- Implementation of changes
- Time allocation for changes to stabilise
- Re-measurement
Capability Gap in Operational Safety LOSA Data
Helicopters do not have dedicated “jumpseats” in the manner of many fixed wing passenger aircraft. A few large helicopter types are capable of being fitted with a “jumpseat”, often one that restricts access to the cabin and egress for the crew and the observer. Where a “jumpseat” is not an option the observer must be seated in the cabin, often facing rearward, unless a specific seating arrangement is approved. In addition to the availability and access issues, the carriage of an observer reduces payload and so revenue, for example an 8-passenger helicopter suffers a payload and revenue reduction of 12.5%, impacting both the operator and the customer.
Since the conception of LOSA in the 1990s, the size and capability of audio-visual recording and data handling equipment has improved dramatically. Whereas use of replayed in-cockpit recording for LOSA would not have been feasible at the inception of LOSA 30 years ago, current technology using high-definition cameras with image stabilisation, provides an improved recording capability. What this means operationally is that crew performance data previously unattainable due to jumpseat restrictions can be accessed and utilised by operator Safety, Standards and Training departments to improve operational safety performance. Further, that camera-based LOSA can support traditional observer-based LOSA by enhancing the validity and accuracy of TEM coding.
Next Steps
The creation of an H-LOSA capability that does not have a significant impact on payload would be the logical objective. In order to validate the capability of modern lightweight high definition cameras, a trial LOSA to assess the feasibility of using post flight video would be the next logical step. Such a capability might be used to support conventional LOSA or even to replace the observer with cameras; the observation and scoring progress would likely be affected as would the baseline requirements of observation software which should be optimised for immediate scoring during a post flight video replay.
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Author
Simon Stewart
Managing Director, Sirius Aviation Limited
Simon.Stewart@siriusav.com
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